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Fairly Pricing Guilty Pleas
ANNE R. TRAUM*
I. INTRODUCTION
How do we ensure that guilty plea outcomes are fair? This article
considers how the late Professor Andrew Taslitz's work on Fair Price
Theory sheds light on this question. Professor Taslitz was deeply con-
cerned about the impact of the criminal justice system on the poor and
minorities, and looked to other disciplines for ideas that could assist in
understanding and reforming our legal system. Increasingly, Profes-
sor Taslitz turned his attention to what he called "The Guilty Plea
State,"' in which prosecutors and defense counsel privately negotiate
plea deals with little judicial oversight and no public involvement. In
the guilty plea state, prosecutors set the "price" for plea-bargaining
through charging decisions.2 And as Professor Taslitz argued in Judg-
ing Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem,' those pricing de-
cisions affect the defendant's and the community's perception of
whether our criminal justice system is fair.
At the time of his death, Professor Taslitz had in the hopper a
manuscript, "Plea Bargaining and Fair Price Theory." True to his
style, Professor Taslitz likely would have explored in this unfinished
piece how Fair Price Theory, a branch of behavioral economics, can
help us better understand and regulate fairness in the guilty plea con-
text. Fair price theory helps us understand what makes a price fair,
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I
am grateful to Dean Daniel W. Hamilton, who provided financial support for this project, and to
the Howard Law Journal and Professors Josephine Ross, Lenese Herbert, and Ellen Podgor, for
organizing and inviting me to participate in the Symposium, "The Taslitz Galaxy: A Gathering of
Scholars at Howard," for which this Article was prepared. I received helpful comments from the
participants in the Symposium and from Bret Birdsong and Angela Morrison.
1. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Guilty Plea State, 23 CRIM. J. 4, 4 (2008) [hereinafter Guilty
Plea State].
2. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 421, 428 (2009) [hereinafter Judging Jena's D.A.].
3. Id. at 428-29.
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and Professor Taslitz harnessed the theory to examine fairness in the
criminal justice system.
Building on Professor Taslitz's work, this article explores how
Fair Price Theory can help us analyze the fairness of guilty pleas. In
Judging Jena's D.A., Professor Taslitz used Fair Price Theory to ex-
plore how prosecutors could strive to achieve fairness and reduce the
perception of racial stigma. He used Fair Price Theory to propose a
system of prosecutorial ethics that takes into account racial stigma.'
This article considers how Fair Price Theory challenges courts to ana-
lyze guilty pleas differently, by focusing on price without relying on
the agency of prosecutors. Under current doctrine, a court examines
whether the defendant's decision to plead guilty is voluntary, in-
formed, and factually supported. Courts do not assess whether the
defendant is getting a fair deal or fair price. Fair Price Theory could
help define and assess what makes a deal (or price) fair. And that
analysis, with its related questions, challenges the status quo by mak-
ing price and fairness a central inquiry.
Fair Price Theory is useful for conceptualizing fairness in the
guilty plea context. The theory is attractive because it is comes from
the marketplace and is based on marketplace behavior. Though con-
tract law, which involves bargaining and pricing, has been an impor-
tant ingredient in the law governing guilty pleas, Fair Price Theory
adds an important behavioral dimension.' It recognizes that fairness
is based on both process and result (or outcome). Fair Price Theory
reinforces the common-sense notion that fairness reflects procedural
and substantive values.
Fair Price Theory poses a challenge to the status quo because it
asks courts to think about procedure and substance in somewhat unfa-
miliar ways. Courts currently leave the job of charging to the prosecu-
tor and assume that the parties, especially counseled defendants, can
negotiate fair results. But courts do not investigate or regulate the
process used to generate the price, and, understandably, might worry
such scrutiny could tread on the prosecutor's charging authority or
violate rules forbidding court-involvement in plea negotiations. Regu-
lating that pricing process, which typically occurs off-the-record and
behind closed doors, is new territory. Additionally, plea-pricing
touches on the discrete stages of charging, guilt adjudication and sen-
4. Id. at 395-96, 398.
5. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contracts, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1910 (1992).
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tencing, which get blended into a single plea-bargaining negotiation.
Parties negotiate the charge with sentencing in mind, and may lock in
sentencing certainty through charge-bargaining or prosecutor recom-
mendations. Fair Price Theory provides an attractive, market-based
reason for courts to focus on price. That shift in focus could be
significant.
This essay revisits how Fair Price Theory informed Professor Tas-
litz's critique of prosecutorial charging decisions, especially in the Jena
Six case, and explores how Fair Price Theory, by focusing on price,
might challenge us to rethink how guilty pleas are regulated, with fair-
ness in mind.
II. THE PROBLEM: REGULATING FAIRNESS IN THE
GUILTY PLEA STATE
A. The Guilty Plea State
Professor Taslitz echoed the concerns of so many others in
describing our system of guilty pleas. In the forward to an ABA sym-
posium on plea-bargaining, Professor Taslitz described our traditional
trial-adjudication system as the "Due Process State," and labeled our
current system as the "Guilty Plea State."6 More recently the Su-
preme Court described the current system, in which over 94% of con-
victions result from guilty pleas, as "our system of pleas."' Though
guilty plea adjudication has been the dominant mode of conviction for
nearly a century, it is less regulated and thus less developed compared
to the dominant trial-based adjudication model.
The Due Process State, as Professor Taslitz and others have rec-
ognized, is loaded with constitutional, statutory, and institutional pro-
tections designed to ensure adversarial testing, community
participation, judicial oversight, and accurate and fair results. Justice
Scalia referred to this model, with its elaborate procedural protec-
tions, as "the gold standard of American justice-a full-dress criminal
trial with its innumerable constitutional and statutory" protections.'
The reality is that few cases proceed to trial, nearly all convictions
result from guilty pleas, and virtually every defendant engages in plea
negotiations before conviction.' The Guilty Plea State, in contrast to
6. Guilty Plea State, supra note 1, at 4.
7. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407
(2012).
8. Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. Guilty Plea State, supra note 1, at 4.
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the Due Process State, does not fully embody the same set of constitu-
tional values.
The problem, in Professor Taslitz's view, was not pleading guilty,
but rather the opaque, secretive, pressurized environment in which
plea-bargaining takes place, without public participation or much judi-
cial oversight. As he wrote, "[i]n the Guilty Plea State, negotiations
take place largely in secret. The parties must persuade one another
but not any representatives of the people. No judge supervises the
proceedings. No transcript is made of the discussions. Moreover, few
constitutional or statutory rights apply, and most of those that do can
readily be waived."' 0 The real problem, Professor Taslitz argued, is
"the nearly unregulated status of the system, a consequence of pre-
tending that we still live in the fictional Due Process State when it
long ago withered away."" Of course, Professor Taslitz was not alone
in critiquing the laissez-faire market of plea-bargaining and recogniz-
ing the need for regulation and oversight.12
Compared to the Due Process State, there is a dearth of regula-
tion in the Guilty Plea State. The elaborate trial-based model, though
imperfect, embodies dearly held notions of community participation,
predictability, oversight, and accuracy. Prosecutors charge and mar-
shal evidence, defense counsel test and counter the prosecution's case,
the jury weighs the evidence and determines guilt, and the judge refer-
ees the trial and later imposes sentence. The Guilty Plea State, in
stark contrast, is largely unregulated and exists as a market model in
which prosecutors (sellers) have monopoly power, defendants (con-
sumers) have few protections, the community is not involved, and
judges play a largely perfunctory role."
Reforming the Guilty Plea State is a challenging task.14 Scholars
advocate different approaches, reflecting their views about what needs
10. Guilty Plea State, supra note 1, at 4.
11. Guilty Plea State, supra note 1, at 5.
12. See e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. Louis
U. PUB. L. REV. 79, 79 (2011) ("[T]he Court has taken a laissez-faire, hands off approach, assum-
ing that plea bargaining is a rational and well-functioning market in which price signals obviate
regulation."); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1044 (2006) (unreviewable prosecutorial discretion at charge bargaining "stands in sharp tension
with the separation of powers); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857,
868 (2000) (describing modern prosecutor's "unilateral power to deal").
13. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (2011) (analogizing the evolution of
enhanced plea bargaining protections with heightened protection for consumers).
14. Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes To Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66 FLA. L. REV.
823, 853 (2014).
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to be fixed. Some reformers seek to improve the current market-
based system.'" Others strive to inject into guilty plea adjudication
more meaningful constitutional or institutional checks, like increased
judicial oversight and community participation, which mirror or adapt
trial-based procedural protections.16 Professor Taslitz urged courts to
be more involved in policing guilty plea agreements, encouraged pros-
ecutors to temper their offers based on ethical concerns, and insisted
on greater protection of defendants. Such process controls could yield
more accurate results and faith in the process." Professor Taslitz's
work on Fair Price Theory further supports his call for reforms that
would make the Guilty Plea State more transparent and just.
B. Fair Price Theory and the Jena Six
Professor Taslitz drew on Fair Price Theory to critique
prosecutorial charging decisions that perpetuate racial stigma. He re-
lied on the theory to explore the themes of racial injustice surrounding
the 2006 "Jena Six" case, in which six African-American high school
students were convicted of assaulting a white classmate at Jena High
School in Jena, Louisiana. The black students were treated more
harshly than whites students and adults at every stage of the criminal
justice process, from charging to bail to sentencing.'s Relying on Fair
Price Theory, Professor Taslitz argued that prosecutors should take
into account racial harm to avoid the kind of racial stigma and com-
munity resentment sparked in the Jena Six case.
For Professor Taslitz, the Jena Six case illustrated how racial harm
can (or should) impact prosecutorial charging decisions. The facts,
retold by Professor Taslitz in his article, underscore how a prosecu-
tor's charging decisions can lead to results that, though legally defensi-
ble, appear racially skewed. The Jena Six were six African-American
teenagers who were expelled from school and criminally charged for
their alleged assault of a white student named Justin Barker.1 9 The
assault of Barker stemmed from a dispute about the "white tree," a
15. Id. at 864.
16. Laura Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L. J. 731, 747-50 (2010) (arguing that a com-
munity jury should preside over pleas); Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargain-
ing With Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1243-45 (2007).
17. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 442-44.
18. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 397, 456-57.
19. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 393; Andrew E. Taslitz & Carol Steiker, Introduc-
tion to the Symposium: The Jena Six, The Prosecutorial Conscience, and the Dead Hand of His-
tory, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 275, 276-78 (2009).
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large tree under which only white students sat.2 0 One of the black
students received permission from the school to sit under the tree.2 1
Shortly thereafter, three hangman's nooses hung from the tree.2 2 Af-
ter several black students sat under the tree,23 the district attorney
warned, "I can end your lives with the stroke of a pen." 24 In the same
community, a black student named Robert Bailey was attacked by a
white student outside a party and, the following day,2 5 was threatened
outside a store by a white man, who grabbed a shotgun from his truck,
purportedly to use on Bailey. After Bailey and some friends wrestled
the gun away form the man, they took it to police to report the inci-
dent. The local prosecutor charged the white student who assaulted
Bailey with simple battery, did not charge the white man who grabbed
his gun from his truck,26 and charged Bailey and his friends with rob-
bery for the theft of the firearm.2 7
Two days later at Jena High, a white student named Justin Barker
was injured in a schoolyard brawl and six black teens were arrested
and charged with second-degree assault, which was later increased to
attempted second-degree murder. One of the teens, Mychal Bell, was
initially prosecuted as an adult.28 Barker, the white victim, was
charged with a firearm offense and released on $5,000 bail.29 For the
Jena Six, bail ranged from $70,000 to $138,000.30
As Professor Taslitz observed, the white defendants received
more lenient treatment than the black students in terms of the serious-
ness of charges, size of the bond, length of sentences sought, arrest
versus intra-school discipline, and adult versus juvenile court." Two
of the prosecutor's decisions garnered particular criticism. First, by
charging Mychal Bell with attempted second-degree murder, the pros-
ecutor was able to transfer the case to adult court, exposing Bell to
higher criminal penalties. Although the prosecutor later reduced the
charge, observers suspected that the prosecutor increased the charges
20. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 276.
21. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 276-77.
22. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 277.
23. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 277.
24. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 277.
25. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 277.
26. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 277-78.
27. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 277-78.
28. See Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 275-76, 279.
29. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 278.
30. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 278.
31. See Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 278-80.
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in order to secure harsher penalties.3 2 Second, the prosecutor did not
charge the noose-incident as a hate crime, which would have exposed
the white defendants to longer sentences. 33 The prosecutor defended
his charging decisions as legally required, but critics observed that the
charging decisions were highly discretionary.3 4
Professor Taslitz drew on Fair Price Theory to argue that prosecu-
tors should temper their charging decisions to avoid reinforcing racial
stigma. Professor Taslitz described Fair Price Theory as a branch of
behavioral economics that "addresses the emotional reaction of buy-
ers to prices that they perceive to be unfair." 36 . First, prices that vio-
late social norms of equity, equality, and need will be perceived as
distributively unfair.3 1 In this context, equity means getting what you
paid for, equality means being treated the same as others similarly
situated, and need means making special allowance for the
disadvantaged.
Second, a buyer will perceive a price as procedurally unfair if the
process for determining the price lacks transparency or reflects favor-
itism. 39 Hence the buyer will perceive greater fairness in the price if
they have some voice and control in setting the price, the process for
determining the price is clear and rational, and favoritism doesn't play
a role.40 Imbalances in the marketplace, Professor Taslitz argued, can
lead to a sense of procedural unfairness. 4 1 Common sources of imbal-
ance in the criminal justice marketplace include lack of information
and resources that are so critical to making a fully informed deci-
sion.4 2 The plea-bargaining process lacks transparency because de-
fendants often plea-bargain based on incomplete information, are not
privy to negotiations between the prosecutor and defense counsel, and
32. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 279-80 (explaining that after conviction the appellate
court remanded the case to juvenile court where Bell pled guilty to simple battery).
33. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 280.
34. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 281-83 (referring to the N.Y. Times 'rticle the prose-
cutor wrote in defense of his prosecutorial discretion). See Reed Walters, Op-Ed, Justice in Jena,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A27 (rebutting descriptions of the events by commentators as "'a
schoolyard fight,' as it has been commonly described in the news media and by critics").
35. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428-30.
36. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428 & n.261-62.
37. Judging lena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428.
38. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428.
39. See Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428.
40. See Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428-29.
41. See Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 429-30.
42. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 431.
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may feel that momentous and complex decisions are rushed or rote.43
Prosecutors are far better resourced and enjoy broad power to set the
price for a guilty plea, demand waivers of important rights- including
access to relevant information and judicial review, and coerce a plea
by increasing the trial penalty.4
Third, an unfair price will trigger retaliatory behavior sparked by
anger, which Professor Taslitz called "retributive anger." 45 This anger,
Professor Taslitz wrote, stems from the perception of being treated as
less worthy than you are. 46 It is this perceived sense of unfairness-
which stems from a lack of distributive and procedural fairness- that
can lead to frustration and different forms of "retributive anger." 4 7
For the defendant, this resentment can impede his own rehabilitation
and lead to recidivism.48 A community that perceives such unfairness
may be less law-abiding, less willing to cooperate, which can lead to
higher crime and other ill effects.4 9 Professor Taslitz argued that
charging and plea-bargaining, the key "pricing decision" are two
prosecutorial decisions that can contribute to race-stigmatization.o
Thus, summarizing the three key aspects of Fair Price Theory, Profes-
sor Taslitz argued that a prosecutor's unfair pricing reinforces racial
stigma, leads to anger and resentment, and sends a message to individ-
uals and communities that the system is unfair.
Reflecting on the Jena Six, Professor Taslitz proposed that prose-
cutors could incorporate racial justice concerns into their charging or
"pricing" decisions.51 The current "Do-justice Adversarialism," Pro-
fessor Taslitz wrote, assumes that the prosecutor and represented de-
fendants are equal adversaries on a level playing field. In that model,
the prosecutor's adversarial zeal is tempered by an ethical, public duty
to "do justice."S2 But the model permitted what happened in Jena
43. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 430-34 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 626,
631-32 (2002)) (suggesting that prosecutors are not required to disclose exculpatory evidence
before a guilty plea).
44. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 432.
45. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 429.
46. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 429.
47. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 429.
48. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 429 (citing JEREMY TRAvis, AMY L. SOLOMON &
MICHELLE WAUL, URBAN INST., FROM PRISON To HOME 10-13 (2001)).
49. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 420.
50. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 421.
51. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 421.
52. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 442.
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when ostensibly racially-neutral prosecutorial decisions led to harsher
treatment of the black students.5 3
Professor Taslitz proposed that instead of the flawed and narrow
"do-justice" model, a model of ethics for prosecutors should mimic
the model of ethics for medical practitioners, which embraces core
principles of prevention, "do no harm," and holistic treatment. 54 This
model would encourage prosecutors to take into account and avoid
the racial stigma and harm, what Professor Taslitz termed "racial dis-
esteem," that can flow from individual charging decisions." A single
charge may be legally justified, but does not occur in a vacuum and
may not be justifiable when balanced against countervailing concerns
about fairness. Prosecutors, Professor Taslitz wrote, are the "regula-
tors of the market for racial disesteem, reinforcing pre-existing market
biases working against racial minorities."" Fair Price Theory provides
a framework to define fairness in a way that incorporates these
broader concerns and factors them into the pricing calculus.5 7
Beyond prosecutorial ethics, Fair Price Theory provides useful in-
sights on plea pricing, the aspect of the criminal justice system that
actually operates as a market place of sellers (prosecutors) and buyers
(defendants). Here the theory can help define what makes a guilty
plea fair. And that inquiry, it turns out, poses a significant challenge
to the status quo.
III. REORIENTING GUILTY PLEA REGULATION TO
FOCUS ON FAIR RESULTS
Fair Price Theory, by focusing on price, offers a model for think-
ing about fairness in the guilty plea context." The theory helps to
identify what qualities make a price fair. The answer is that fairness is
an amalgam of different components: there are the components that
result in the price or result (distributive fairness) and the components
that make up the process used to generate that result (procedural fair-
ness). While Fair Price Theory has much to offer in terms of under-
standing and regulating the plea-bargaining marketplace and guilty
plea process, two key insights are fundamental. First, fairness is both
53. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 417-18.
54. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 449.
55. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 430.
56. Taslitz & Steiker, supra note 19, at 290.
57. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 433-34.
58. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428.
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substantive and procedural, meaning that results, not just process, re-
ally matter.5 9 Second, procedural fairness in this context refers to the
process used to generate the price.6 0 These two insights are important
because they pose a challenge to our current system, which neither
regulates substantive results at the plea stage, nor regulates the pro-
cess for generating plea prices. Fair Price Theory provides a market-
based framework for courts to regulate the fairness of guilty pleas.
This challenges the status quo by reorienting courts to think about
what is most important to the parties and society: getting a fair deal
and having a system that produces fair deals.
A. A Market-based Framework for Testing Fairness
Fair Price Theory is a market-based model for exploring what
makes a price fair. The theory is developed in Dr. Sarah Maxwell's
work The Price is Wrong, which explores fair pricing as a mix of cul-
tural norms, power dynamics, and emotional responses that inform
one's sense of what is fair.6 1 Her work on fair pricing provides impor-
tant insights for regulating plea-bargaining because it offers a vocabu-
lary for assessing fairness in a buyer-seller marketplace of negotiated
outcomes, and thus provides a market-based, instead of a trial-based,
model for assessing the fairness of guilty pleas. Dr. Maxwell's ap-
proach is potentially useful because plea-bargaining is mostly unregu-
lated, courts do not analyze whether each pleas achieves a fair result,
and market imbalances can distort plea results. Dr. Maxwell explores
whether just pricing can ensure personal and social fairness. Impor-
tantly, Dr. Maxwell has illustrated a two-step model (price first, pro-
cess second) that evaluates the fairness of price.
In criminal law, the fairness of plea deals is largely unregulated
territory.6 2 Criminal procedure doctrine is shaped around trial being
the "main event," and changes in trial procedure are implemented in
the courtroom. The system of pleas, by contrast, plays out mostly
outside the courtroom, in private negotiations between the prosecutor
and defense counsel, and with minimal judicial oversight.64 Plea-bar-
59. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428 (citing MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 74).
60. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428 (citing MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 76-80).
61. See generally SARAH MAXWELL, THE PRICE IS WRONG (2008)..
62. Bibas, supra note 13, at 1119.
63. See, e.g., McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S 1256, 1264 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("The trial is the main event in this system, where the prosecution and the defense do
battle to reach a presumptively reliable result.").
64. Traum, supra note 14.
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gaining blends three key phases of the criminal process - charging,
guilt adjudication, and sentencing - into a single negotiation. The
prosecutor decides which charges to bring, and can add, dismiss, or
reduce charges during plea-bargaining.6 5 The court, which is not in-
volved in plea-bargaining, accepts the plea and later imposes sentence.
Looking at a court docket sheet in a guilty plea case, these discrete
proceedings - charging, pleading guilty, and sentencing - would ap-
pear as a distinct phases. But practically, for the parties, these phases
are fully integrated into a plea negotiation, which fixes the charge and
conviction, and predicts, or even mandates, a specific sentence.
The court, in accepting a guilty plea, performs a ritualized due
process inquiry, but it is not about the fairness of the plea deal. To
accept a guilty plea, a court must adhere to a few constitutional rules:
the defendant must understand the rights he's waiving by giving up his
right to trial, as well as the terms and consequences of the plea.66 The
defendant must admit facts that satisfy the elements of the offense. 7
Though a coerced plea violates due process, it is widely acknowledged
that defendants plead guilty under extreme pressure to avoid harsher
sentencing consequences after a trial conviction.6 8 Guilty plea adjudi-
cation can be rote and formal, and does not require the court to learn
much about the case or the defendant.69 The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that guilty pleas, not trial-convictions, are the norm, and
that plea-bargaining determines the conviction and the sentence.o
Traditionally, courts have not asked, before accepting a guilty
plea, whether the defendant received a fair deal. This is because the
fairness questions that the court examines primarily go to the volunta-
riness of the plea, admitted elements, and waiver of rights, not the
substance of the deal and how it compares with others. The Supreme
Court has intimated, however, a general expectation that similar de-
65. Traum, supra note 14, at 835.
66. Traum, supra note 14, at 828.
67. Traum,supra note 14, at 830 n.30 (citing, inter alia, Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637,
644-45 & n.13 (1976) (requiring for valid guilty plea the defendant understands the nature of the
charge against him).
68. Traum, supra note 14, at 833 (discussing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. (1963)) (ob-
serving that many defendants plead guilty to get a more lenient sentence, to get reduced or
dismissed charges, to gain certainty, and avoid the "agony and expense" of trial).
69. Traum, supra note 14, at 832 (citing Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731,
733 (2010) ("Guilty pleas, although indispensible to the smooth processing of criminal justice,
have become hasty and rote.").
70. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407
(2012).
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fendants get similar results." In Lafler and Frye, the Court recog-
nized that ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining
phase could lead to a more serious conviction and a longer sentence.
Ineffective assistance can contribute to uneven results, but it is not the
only factor that can distort the plea market. Other market imbalances
include the outsized power of the prosecutor, lack of transparency
about the plea bargaining process, lack of relevant case information,
and lack of judicial oversight.73  How does a defendant, or defense
counsel, or the trial judge, know if a plea deal is fair? Fair pricing
theory can help answer that question.
Several key concepts inform our perception of what makes a
price "fair." A fair price is one that is both "acceptable" and "just,"
terms that Dr. Maxwell assigns distinct meanings in evaluating fair-
ness.74 An acceptable price is satisfactory, favorable or reflects ex-
pected value.75  A "just" price is consistent with social norms, rules
and logic, in that it is free of favoritism or bias, just to all parties, and
equitable. 6 The difference between an acceptable price and a just
price is the difference between what Dr. Maxwell terms "personal"
and "social" fairness. A personally fair price is one that is low enough
to meet your expectations. A socially fair price is one that is the
same for everyone, not exploitative of consumer demand, and doesn't
result in outsized profit or benefit to the seller.
Both personal and social fairness reflect social norms about pric-
ing, including who sets the price, what's included in the price, and how
much information is available about pricing.79 Social norms affecting
personal fairness might reflect what has been charged for the same
thing in the past, for example, including tires in the price of a car."
Social norms affecting social fairness reflect societal values on how
71. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
72. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 ("The favorable sentence that
eluded the defendant in the criminal proceeding appears to be the sentence he or others in his
position would have received in the ordinary course, absent the failings of counsel."). "The ex-
pected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases. It is like the sticker price for
cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything less a
bargain." Id. (quoting Bibas, supra note 13, at 1138) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 430-33.
74. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 6-7.
75. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 6.
76. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 6.
77. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 7.
78. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 7.
79. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 8 (referring to Table 1.1).
80. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 8.
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people should behave, such as charging all customers the same price,
and not sneaking in hidden surcharges. Violating those social norms is
socially unfair because we as a society expect goods to be priced in a
particular way and are offended when they are not.8 '
Fairness is the emotional part of economic decision making, as
Professor Taslitz observed in his work critiquing prosecutorial "pric-
ing" or charging decisions.82 Unfair pricing prompts an emotional re-
sponse and, not surprisingly, social unfairness prompts a stronger
emotional response like "retributive anger."" Charging restaurant
patrons extra for bread is a minor annoyance that is unlikely to pro-
voke a strong response. But consumers will react more strongly if a
store engages in unfair pricing, by misleading customers on price, hid-
ing extra costs that should be included, or other deviations from so-
cially accepted price terms.8 4 Consumers' emotional sense of fairness
is a powerful component of economic decision making because it gen-
erates a fast, convincing belief about whether a price is good or bad."
Without this emotional guidance, consumers have trouble making a
decision to buy. Fairness, Dr. Maxwell argues, is the emotional "yes"
or "no."86
Socially fair pricing turns on the fairness of the outcome and the
fairness of the process that led to that outcome.87 This insight, taken
directly from Dr. Maxwell's work on fair pricing, seems directly appli-
cable to plea-bargaining. Dr. Maxwell's model starts with personal
fairness and escalates to a broader inquiry about social fairness. Dr.
Maxwell uses the example of an advertised sports car to illustrate this
two-step inquiry for investigating the fairness of the price. The exam-
ple underscores how Fair Price Theory, which starts with results and
then examines the process that generated those results, could alter our
approach to evaluating plea deals.
Dr. Maxwell considers a hypothetical consumer, who is intrigued
by an advertisement for a new sports car priced at $35,000. When this
consumer arrives at the dealership, she is told the price is actually
$45,000. The consumer certainly would view this change as personally
unfair (annoying, expensive, not what she expected), and this feeling
81. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 8.
82. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 9; Judging Jena's D.A., supra note 2, at 428.
83. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 9.
84. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 9-10.
85. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 9-10.
86. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 9-10.
87. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 26.
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would prompt her to query whether the price is also socially unfair.
Determining social unfairness begins with determining the fairness of
the outcome, and if that's concerning, the fairness of the process that
led to that outcome." The first is a question of substantive, or distrib-
utive fairness, which tests whether the result, the price, is acceptable.
The second issue, which examined the process that led to this result, is
a question of procedural fairness. Here, the consumer's decision will
depend on whether she concludes the price increase violates social
norms. Is the dealership being sneaky, or is the price increase justified
for legitimate reasons? If the price violates social norms, the con-
sumer will not agree to pay it and may be angry at the dealership. If
the price increase is consistent with social norms, the consumer will
conclude that the price is just, and might agree to pay it.
B. Results First Analysis of Guilty Pleas Would Challenge the
Status Quo
Dr. Maxwell's two-step process for querying the fairness of a
price (price first, process second) offers important insights for how
courts might regulate the fairness of guilty pleas. This approach chal-
lenges traditional doctrine and reframes the courts' job in some spe-
cific and more general ways. First, putting results first, procedure
second, is the opposite of how courts tend to analyze legal challenges
to guilty pleas and sentences. Second, what do we mean by proce-
dure? Fair Price Theory is very clear on this point: procedural fairness
refers to the process that generated the price. This, too, challenges the
way courts analyze guilty pleas. In adjudicating a guilty plea, courts
ask certain questions, but not others. Courts focus on whether a guilty
plea is knowing and voluntary, with the right to a jury trial providing
the conceptual backdrop for that inquiry. Fair Price Theory would
reorient that inquiry to examine a different procedural issue, specifi-
cally, the process used to generate the price. Hence, price is center
stage, and process questions play a supporting role in generating and
testing fair results.
1. Making Results Central
Results are what defendants and prosecutors care about most: the
conviction and sentence. Though courts also care about results, they
play a limited role in the substantive result of a case, and legal analysis
88. MAXWELL, supra note 61, at 26.
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usually requires courts to consider procedure first, results second.
This is because courts primarily regulate procedure, and review results
that are connected or caused by a procedural violation. Putting re-
sults first flips the traditional order of operations. A results-first anal-
ysis would shift the court's focus from deciding whether there was a
procedural violation, to deciding whether the plea procedure led to a
substantively fair result. Although this may seem foreign at the plea
stage, courts routinely evaluate results at the sentencing stage and
have great familiarity with the charging, plea, and sentencing practices
in their courts. Assessing results at the plea stage poses a challenge to
the status quo in that it reorients the court's focus with intent to en-
sure substantive fairness. That shift in focus might also cause courts to
think harder about whether the pre-plea procedure is designed to
yield substantively fair results.
Generally, judicial attention in criminal cases is aimed at ensuring
procedural, not substantive, regularity. 9 Courts primarily regulate
criminal procedure consistent with deeply ingrained institutional
roles. Before sentencing, courts act as referees in a process that is
party-driven and litigated against the backdrop of an impending jury
trial. Before trial, prosecutors charge and defense counsel seek to dis-
miss unsubstantiated charges and litigate procedural defects, such as
illegal search and seizure. At trial, the prosecutor has the burden of
proof, the court ensures that the trial is fair, and the jury determines
whether the defendant is guilty. After the trial, the court switches
gears when it imposes sentence, and impacts the case result.
The court's role is not that different in a guilty plea case. Trial
adjudication remains the default. Key procedural protections, like the
right to Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation, and the
right to exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, are tethered
to constitutional trial rights. The process for accepting a guilty plea
operates as a substitute for the trial itself, with the court ensuring that
the defendant understands the process he is giving up by pleading
guilty, and the consequences of pleading guilty. The court is not in-
89. Criminal procedure governs the process for obtaining convictions and sentences. Sub-
stantive constitutional limits on convictions or sentences are rare. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional state law criminalizing consensual, adult sexual
activity inside the home); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (Eighth Amendment bars
capital punishment for children); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment
prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile convicted of a non-
homicide offense).
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volved and does not regulate the private, out-of-court negotiation that
establishes the charges of conviction and the likely sentence.
Because courts primarily regulate procedure, results are a secon-
dary concern. Whether at the trial, appellate, or collateral level,
courts first consider whether there was a procedural error in the un-
derlying case, and then consider whether that error made a difference
in the outcome of the case.90 Sentencing review, if any, typically fo-
cuses on procedural aspects of the sentence, not whether the imposed
sentence was fair.91 When a sentencing court acts within its legal au-
thority and complies with sentencing rules, the sentence will not be
second-guessed by a reviewing court. To successfully challenge a
guilty plea, a defendant must point to some procedural defect. An
unfair result, on its own, is not enough.
The Supreme Court has recognized that plea-sentences, not trial-
sentences, are the norm and that, for the parties, it is all about the
result. Ours "is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of
trials,"9 2 the Supreme Court acknowledged in Lafler. The Supreme
Court traditionally has assumed that the parties would negotiate to a
fair result. 93 The Court's recent decisions illustrate how that give-and-
take can be hobbled by ineffective counsel's failure to inform the de-
fendant of immigration consequences of the plea, to communicate the
government's plea offer, or to correctly evaluate the charged of-
fense.94 In doctrinal terms, Padilla, Frye, and Lafler broke new
ground in terms of applying Strickland during the plea-bargaining
stage. These cases also illustrate the "process first" model: to get re-
90. A court considers whether an error was harmless, meaning that the error did not make a
difference in the outcome of the case. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52 (describing harmless and plain error).
Most constitutional errors are reviewed under harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, but
a few, like denial of counsel or retained counsel of choice, are deemed "structural error," mean-
ing that the court cannot evaluate the prejudicial impact of the error, and thus must order a new
proceeding. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 (2006).
91. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration At Sentencing, 64 HASTINGs L.J., 423, 446-47
(2013) (describing limited, error-based review of sentences on appeal).
92. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012), quoted in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399, 1407 (2012).
93. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (assuming that in the "give-and-
take negotiation common in plea bargaining . .. the prosecution and defense ... arguably pos-
sess relatively equal bargaining power").
94. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (holding that the trial counsel was ineffective when, based on
incorrect legal advice, he advised the defendant to reject a favorable plea); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at
1408 (holding that counsel was deficient for failing to timely communicate a plea offer that
would have resulted in a shorter sentence and lesser offense); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
374 (2010) (holding that counsel was deficient in failing to accurately advise the defendant about
the certainty deportation after pleading guilty to a drug trafficking offense).
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lief, a defendant must prove a procedural defect (such as deficient
counsel).
Results-first analysis would evaluate and compare plea pricing.
Under the process-first analysis, a defendant would have no basis, ab-
sent a procedural defect, to complain, "my sentence was twice as long
as his." Results-first analysis would reframe that claim in terms of the
fairness of plea pricing: Why did Defendant A, similarly situated to
Defendant B, get twice as much time? This inquiry leads ineluctably
to a number of other comparative and case-specific questions that
may touch on sentencing questions (like culpability or disparities) and
procedural factors, like the quality of defense counsel, variability in
prosecutors, whether the defendant pled early or later in the case
timeline, etc. Results-first analysis leads inevitably to an explication
and investigation of how and why the parties reached this result.
Though procedural defects are the gateway to relief, courts un-
derstand that plea-bargaining is about results and that just results are
paramount." The Court has tested prejudice under Strickland by
evaluating whether counsel's deficient performance led to a longer
sentence.9 6 The Court recognizes that plea-sentences are the norm,
and that defendants should expect results that are on par with what
similarly positioned defendants receive in other cases. This last point,
that similar defendants get similar results, is a bedrock principle of
sentencing laws, with which courts are also familiar. Modern sentenc-
ing laws have aspired to reduce disparate treatment among similarly
situated defendants, and reinforce predictable results. So while courts
primarily regulate and remedy procedural violations, they understand
the importance of just and fair results.
2. Redefining Procedure
Fair Price Theory could reorient courts to focus on the process
that generated the guilty plea. This is a significant change in direction
for courts, which do not regulate charging or plea-bargaining.9 7 In
95. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 ("[T]he right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be
defined or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays in securing
convictions and determining sentences.").
96. Id. ("That position ignores the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-
four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas . . . . It is insufficient simply to
point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial
process.").
97. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 ("This underscores that the plea-bargaining process is often in
flux, with no clear standards or timelines and with no judicial supervision of the discussions
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guilty plea adjudication, courts ask certain questions, but not others.
Courts focus on whether the plea is knowing and voluntary, with the
right to jury trial providing the conceptual backdrop for that inquiry.9 8
Fair Price Theory would redirect courts to examine a different kind of
procedural fairness, specifically, the process used to generate the
price. The previous examples illustrate how this inquiry flows natu-
rally from results-first analysis: With the price of a guilty plea occupy-
ing center stage, the process questions play a supporting rule in
generating and testing fair results. Fair Price Theory creates a frame-
work for courts to develop and apply procedural rules to generate and
ensure fair pleas.
Every court, including the Supreme Court, understands that
horse-trading transpires between the parties during plea negotia-
tions.99 For decades, the Court has presumed that the prosecutor and
defense counsel operate as equals on a level playing field. The legal
standard is that prosecutors are free to charge any offense supported
by probable cause, and can increase or decrease the charges during
plea-bargaining.o10 The Court has approved prosecutors' use of coer-
cive threats and charge-bargaining to induce defendants to plead
guilty, arguing that such tactics were lawful so long as the charges are
supported by probable cause.' 1 One justification for this hands-off
approach is separation of powers.1 02 Because charging, and thus
charge-bargaining is a prosecutorial function, courts have stayed out.
Settlement negotiations are usually privileged, and in some jurisdic-
tions, local rules prohibit court involvement in plea-negotiations. It
was convenient for courts that this hands-off approach produced a
steady stream of guilty pleas.'0 3
More recently, however, the Court has questioned the fairness of
aggressive charge-bargaining and the distorted results it can yield. In
Lafler, the defendant rejected a plea offer based on counsel's incor-
rect legal advice, and received a sentence after a jury conviction that
was three and one half times longer than the plea offer would have
between prosecution and defense. Indeed, discussions between client and defense counsel are
privileged.").
98. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406.
99. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978).
100. Id. at 372.
101. Id. at 364.
102. See id. at 365; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
103. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1070 (2000); Anne R.
Traum, Using Outcomes To Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66 FLA. L. REV. 823, 860-61
(2014).
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yielded.10 4 The Court recognized that the defendant should have got-
ten a sentence closer to the norm, and that in our system of pleas,
trial-based sentences are exceptional. "The expected post-trial sen-
tence is imposed in only a few percent of cases" the Court stated, "[ilt
is like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer
would view full price as the norm and anything less a bargain. "105
The Court has repeatedly expressed concern about prosecutorial
overcharging as a means to induce guilty pleas. The Court in Frye
acknowledged that prosecutors use harsh statutes as negotiating tools,
without regard to culpability or uneven results.1 06 The Court is wary
of prosecutors overcharging, even in relatively minor cases, to induce
defendants to plead guilty.1 07 In recent arguments this term, the
Court circled back to this theme. The Court questioned why a prose-
cutor would charge an offense carrying a twenty-year maximum in-
stead of a similar offense with a five-year maximum, and referenced a
prosecutorial charging manual that instructs prosecutors to seek the
most serious charges available.10 s The Court expressed concern about
prosecutors exercising such broad discretion, and intimated that it
might affect the Court's interpretation of the criminal statute at is-
sue. 109 None of the cases specifically address plea-bargaining, but
they are telling indications of the Court's skepticism about how prose-
cutors deploy statutes to extract guilty pleas, and whether that prac-
tice leads to just results.
As Professor Taslitz and other scholars have argued, there is
much room to improve the process for generating pleas so that it is
104. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
105. See Bibas, supra note 13, at 1138.
106. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citing Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006) ("[Defendants] who do take
their case to trial and lose receive longer sentences than even Congress or the prosecutor might
think appropriate, because the longer sentences exist on the books largely for bargaining pur-
poses. This often results in individuals who accept a plea bargain receiving shorter sentences
than other individuals who are less morally culpable but take a chance and go to trial.").
107. Amy Howe, Justices Take the Measure of Fish Case: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov. 5, 2014, 10:28 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/justices-take-the-measure-of-fish-
case-in-plain-english/ (questioning why prosecutors would charge the defendant with an offense
carrying a twenty-year maximum, when a similar statute carrying a five-year maximum was also
available).
108. Id. (referring to a Department of Justice Manual that "instructs federal prosecutors to
bring the charges that are most severe.") (statement of Justice Scalia) ("[I]f that's going to be the
Department of Justice's position, we're going to have to be very careful about interpreting the
scope [of laws like these].").
109. Id.; Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Court Takes on "Very Peculiar" Bank Robbery
Statute, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 2, 2014, 9:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/argument-
analysis-court-takes-on-very-peculiar-bank-robbery-statute/.
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more transparent, understandable to defendants, predictable, and de-
signed to yield measured, accurate guilty pleas. Prosecutors could be
required to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence to help
defendants better assess the strength of the case against the. Prosecu-
tors could disclose their internal plea pricing policies so that defense
counsel can better understand how the flow of offers, and what factors
contribute to those incremental decisions.
The parties could be required to memorialize the history of plea
offers in the case, so that defendants (and the court) are fully aware of
earlier offers, in case there was a misunderstanding or miscommunica-
tion. Defendants could be educated on the plea market so that they
have a firm understanding of trial risks, sentencing consequences, how
similar defendants have been treated, or why certain options are avail-
able, but not others. In short, there is no shortage of ideas about ways
to improve what is mostly unregulated territory.
Reorienting courts to ensure fair results and to oversee a process
that is designed to yield fair results would be a significant change.
Courts are masters of ensuring fair process, and Fair Price Theory cre-
ates an opportunity for courts to rethink the purpose of the process
for evaluating guilty pleas. Most importantly, getting courts to care
about guilty plea results aligns them with the parties, whose negotia-
tions are results driven. The parties see plea-bargaining as a blending
of charging, guilt, and sentencing. Courts understand that, too, but do
not have a guilty plea adjudication process that reflects that reality.
By probing the fairness of guilty pleas, and managing the procedure
that generates those guilty pleas, courts can play a meaningful role in
the process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Taslitz reached to Fair Price Theory to explore the ra-
cial stigma and harm that flows from prosecutorial charging decisions.
This is because Fair Price Theory offers a broad framework for think-
ing about fairness that links an individual transaction between the
seller (prosecutor) and buyer (defendant), to a broader social context
based on societal norms, distributive fairness, equity and emotions. In
the plea-bargaining market, Fair Price Theory is especially relevant
because it draws on market-place behavior. In subtle and obvious
ways, the theory would pose a challenge to the status quo, especially
for courts, by making price fairness the central focus. The parties are
already there.
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For prosecutors and defendants, plea-bargaining blends into one
seamless negotiation the charging, conviction and sentence. But
courts continue to operate a procedure against the backdrop of an
impending trial, taking a hands-off approach to plea-bargaining, and,
often, a checklist approach to accepting a guilty plea. Fair Price The-
ory would support courts redirecting their focus, in alignment with the
parties, to focus on results and the procedure that generated those
results. While moving in this direction would represent a significant
change, it would give courts a meaningful role in ensuring that our
plea system is designed to yield fair results.
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